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Abstract—Anti-virus companies receive extensive quantities of
malware variants daily; therefore it is essential to automatically
classify them into their corresponding malware family. Here,
we apply an effective statistical approach to identify, and to
render critical malicious patterns into malware families, which
are essential elements of automated classification of known and
unknown malware variants in large quantities. Critical malicious
patterns are the most frequent basic blocks, which are present
most often in one specific malware family, and comparatively
less in all other malware families. By computing the distribution
frequency of each distinct basic block residing in all the malware
families, the importance of being a potential representative of
a critical malicious pattern for a specific malware family is
measured. This value is carefully computed by considering the
population of each malware family, and the distribution frequency
ratio of every distinct basic block among the different malware
families. The results show that known and unknown malware
variants can be effectively and accurately classified into their
related malware family using this approach.
Keywords—Malware Classification; Statistical; Pattern Match-
ing; Malicious Features; Shared Code;
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware is considered to be a major computer security
problem as it can attach to other computer programs and infect
them. Infection is defined as unwanted modification of other
programs to include a (possibly evolved) version of itself [6].
In recent years, malware has become more sophisticated,
goal oriented, and possibly developed by a group of authors
rather than a single author. It is applied to warfare between
governments and organisations with the aim of accessing
sensitive information and affecting each others’ reputations.
Furthermore, the flow of malicious software variants arriving
at, and gaining access into, our networks and computer systems
is so enormous that it is impossible to handle them individually.
Also, malware replication speed urges the need for automated
analysis and classification as it is impossible to analyse and
detect otherwise. Based on reports published by different
antivirus research laboratories, huge amounts of known and
unknown malware variants reach their honeypots, which can-
not be analysed manually. In this paper, we suggest that every
approach towards malware analysis, detection, classification,
and clustering should be either automated or designed in such
a way that makes future automation possible, unless it is
intended to analyse only a limited number of malware variants
for research purposes. On the other hand, modern malware
employs many different obfuscation techniques to hide itself
from antivirus scanners; therefore it is no longer possible to
identify later mutations of malware variants, which belong
to the same malware family, by signature based anti-virus
scanners, as its structure and code is changed.
Although many solutions has been proposed to tackle this
problem, still malware authors are the winners of the race
and every day infections of more systems demonstrates the
limitations of the current detection solutions. Different studies
are published on malware analysis and classification, which
look into different features of malicious software. However,
many of the previous works follow the same approach of
antivirus scanners, in terms of generating a set of signatures
to recognise malware, such as works presented in [11], [18],
[19], [21]. Signature-based malware detection approaches are
limited to the predefined signatures in the database, and the
unknown malware variants are not identifiable. Also, these ap-
proaches are designed in a way, which makes them dependent
on limited dataset, and therefore, the extracted features are
also limited to the state of the training dataset. This limitation
highly effects the future malware variants detection, as every
time a malware replicates it carries some new code. Thus,
over the time, and after few generations, malware variants
from the same malware family, become unrecognisable from
its original form, and difficult to identify if to be analysed
exclusively. Authors in another study [16], has applied exact
similarity measurement technique, which limit the detection
to exact matches, and dependent to the training dataset. Some
of the studies use virtualisation or emulation techniques to
observe malicious behaviour, such as the works presented by
authors in [8], [12], [21], which malware authors bypass them
by embedding anti-virtualisation, anti-emulation techniques in
the malicious code.
In this paper, a supervised learning method is applied
to classify new malware variants into their related malware
families based on an effective statistical approach to iden-
tify, and to render critical malicious patterns into malware
families [20]. To identify the most critical malicious patterns
in every malware family, the authors have relied on the
shared basic blocks among different malware variants, which
potentially occur in ”one” specific family at most. However, the
shared basic blocks in-between different malware families, are
not interesting for classification purposes, as certain functions
are in-common amongst all the malicious software variants,
and can even be in-common with non-malicious software. To
achieve this goal, the frequency distribution ratio for each
constituent basic block of a malware variant within each
malware family is computed. To avoid shared basic blocks
in-between different malware families becoming a member
of critical malicious patterns, the frequency distribution ratio
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value is penalised for its occurrence in other malware families.
The proposed classification method is based on two attributes,
which are defined for every constituent basic block of a
new malware variant, as presented in our recently published
work [20]. Firstly, each basic block is scored based on its
distribution frequency ratio in each malware family, and if it
did not exist previously, it is ignored. Secondly, the distribution
frequency of each basic block based on its occurrence in a
number of different malware variants in each malware family
is computed; according to both of these attributes for all of the
constituent basic blocks of a malware variant, it is classified
into a malware family.
In Section II, the related work and background on different
malicious pattern matching techniques are reviewed. In Section
III, the newly proposed formal method of malware classifica-
tion, the applied methodology, and the implementation process
is described. In Section IV, a performance evaluation of the
experimental method is given. Finally in Section V, the newly
proposed approach for malware classification is discussed and
summarised.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
Two main approaches that are utilised by malware re-
searchers to analyse and detect malicious software are cate-
gorised as static and dynamic. In the following, the existing
studies which have applied similar techniques to the newly
proposed methodology have been reviewed, in order to set
the background. In static analysis approach, different features
of malicious software, and pattern matching techniques are
studied to classify the enormous number of malware variants
getting submitted to honeypots. N-gram frequency distribution
is a well-known approach for extracting features and devel-
oping training dataset for classification of malware variants.
An n-gram is the occurrence of a sequence of n characters
in a string of assembly statement [2], raw bytes [10], [14],
[15], and so on. N-gram computation as a pattern matching
technique, and its application in malware analysis, was first in-
troduced by authors in [7], [13], to identify boot sector viruses
automatically by applying artificial neural networks. Authors
in [15], presented a heuristic method to specify a suitable value
for n. They collected a dataset of 1,971 benign executables,
and 1,942 malicious software samples, and converted them to
hexadecimal representation in ASCII format. They generated
total of 255,904,403 distinct n-gram sequences by extracting
sequences of four-bytes, and combining them into a single
term. They computed the Information Gain (IG) [23], for
each n-gram, selected top 500 n-grams, and applied different
machine learning algorithms to detect and classify malware
variants. They identified the boosted J48 algorithm as the best
detector. Although they found good detection performance,
with areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve of around 0.9, they did not consider metamorphic
obfuscations and polymorphism.
The authors of [17], have followed the same methodology
as the work presented in [15], differing only in producing the
n-gram sequences. They generated the n-gram sequences as
two-byte sequence which do not overlap, while the n-gram
sequences generated by [15] may overlap and are in four-
byte format. Comparatively, the authors in [15] obtained better
performance, and developed a more comprehensive dataset
collection. Both of the studies had difficulty in distinguishing
between benign and malicious software, because of in-common
behaviours such as editing the registry, or mass-mailing. Au-
thors in [16], applied n-perm as variation of n-gram to ease
some of the obfuscation techniques used in malware. N-perm
is defined as a variation of n-gram, and it corresponds to every
possible permutation of sequences of n characters, which are
assigned as n-grams. The authors assumed that the order of
characters in an n-perm sequence are independent of the n-
gram sequence, but identical for the matching measurement.
The results of their study show that applying exact matching
of n-perm sequences, leads to better identification, by han-
dling the presence of metamorphic techniques, such as code
reordering, dead-code insertion, and instruction substitutions.
The authors in [4], applied statistical analysis of opcode
distribution in malicious software and benign software, as a
dataset of in total 20 executable files. They disassembled all
of the files by IDA Pro 1, and their opcode statistics were
computed. The results showed the top five opcodes appearing
in both the malicious and non-malicious software are: mov,
push, call, pop, and cmp. Their preliminary study shows that
less frequent shared opcodes, between the malicious and non-
malicious software are better criteria to distinguish one from
the other.
The authors of [24], extracted function features from dis-
assembled malware variants. The function features include the
count of API calls, the count of referenced strings, and the
count of basic blocks. They did not consider the code, but only
the counts, and applied Supported Vector Machines (SVMs),
to select functions of interest, which are not shared in malware
variants in different malware families. Therefore, the vectors
with large difference from the average are extracted, and the
quantity of the vectors for each malware variant is chosen
based on the number of vectors ”user” inputs, divided by the
total number of functions in a malware. The classification
process is performed by calculating the same values for the
new malware variant, and comparing every function in the new
malware variant with the functions in the feature set. However,
the proposed approach has some flaws, such as the following:
it requires the user to input the number of function features
for each malware family to be involved in the classification,
and the function features for each malware family are defined
regardless to the distribution frequency ratio of the number
of malware variants that exist in every malware family; also it
does not provide much of the functionality relatedness between
different malware families, for the malware analyst.
The authors in [5], presented a recent work on analysing
PE files. They traced and captured API calls made by the
malicious file, and extracted API call sequences from it. For
the purpose of classification, they further generated n-grams
from combination of the API call sequences, and calculated
the Odds Ratio for each n-gram. Odds ratio, is a statistical
calculation of the probability of presence or absence of a
property. Finally, they used machine learning algorithms to
classify malware and benign files. They show a detection
accuracy of 98.5% as the outcome. However, the authors did
not show a proper simulation outcome, and did not explain how
the leading n features of the training dataset are selected. Also,
1I. Guilfanov, IDAPro, An Advanced Interactive Multi-processor Disassem-
bler, Data Rescue. Available: http://www.datarescue.com
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their dataset presented in the evaluation is rather too small to
judge the results. The authors of [21], dynamically analysed
malicious software through an emulator by observing its API
calls at its run time. They extracted the critical API calls,
which are the most significant to a specific family of malware
variants, referred to as principal component analysis (PCA)
features. The frequency of the observed significant API calls
is used to create one signature for every malware family. The
results of this study shows that considering critical API calls
as a signature towards malware identification and filtration is
effective. However, the authors generated signatures based on
a limited number of malware variants, and due to changes in
malware design, which evolve rapidly with time, ultimately
new malware variants unrecognisable from the original form.
The authors in [9], applied fine-grained taint analysis
on Central Processing Unit (CPU) instructions, and Direct
Memory Access (DMA) operations, in order to find malicious
software, which attempts to access information on the host
system. They traced all the sensitive information and instruc-
tions through instrumentation, and as close as possible to the
hardware, in order to produce taint graphs. Using the taint
graphs, and based on predefined policies, the authors could
identify and detect malicious software. They evaluated the
effectiveness of their approach based on 42 malware samples
and 56 benign software samples, and found very few false
positives, and zero false negatives. However, the evaluation
dataset is very small, and malware authors can easily obfuscate
the malware to evade taint analysis. Also, implementation of
this approach is very expensive. The authors of [3], presented a
recent artefact, VirusBattle, which is a malware analysis web-
service. VirusBattle reasons about malware variants in different
levels of abstraction including the code, the statically analysed
shared semantics, referred to as juice [1], amongst different
variants, and the sequence of events that a malware sample
undergoes during its execution, control flow graph (CFG) re-
lated code, to map the similarities and interrelationships. Juice
transforms code semantics computed over a x86 disassembly
by generalising the register names and literal constants, and
computing the algebraic constraints between the numerical
variables. Therefore, semantically similar code fragments can
be identified by comparing their hash values. VirusBattle
provides an automated PE unpacking web-service as well,
which is a generic unpacker 2, and a publicly available web-
service. In this paper, the unpacker provided by the VirusBattle
SDK has been used to unpack the malicious samples, as well as
the juice, which is the generalised presentation of the semantics
to avoid code obfuscations.
III. MALWARE CLASSIFICATION
The classification of a new malware variant into one of
the malware families is performed based on the the iden-
tified critical malicious patterns, as presented in a previous
study [20]. The classification methodology is based on the
Term Frequency Distribution (TFD) value, which is the key
to evaluate the criticality of a basic block, and the count
of malware variants in each malware family which contain
that basic block. These fundamentals are defined based on
2V. Notani, A. Lakhotia, and et al. VirusBattle SDK-Unpacker. Available:
https://bitbucket.org/srl/virusbattle-sdk/wiki/Credits%20for%20VirusBattle
our experimental evaluations, as described in the following
sections.
A. Formalisation
Considering each malware family, f , as a set of malware
variants, and each malware variant be a set of multiple basic
blocks. The malware families are disjoint, in other words each
malware variant can only be a member of one malware family.
Also, considering that a new malware variant to be classified
is a multiset of basic blocks, v, it is assumed that vi, becomes
a member of every existing f in the dataset, one by one.
However, vi, is the ith distinct member of a v which can occur
in any malware family and multiple times.
Definition 1: Let fk be the kth distinct member of f , and
let ⇢vi ,k be the total count of malware variants belonging to
fk, which contain vi, and let  k be the total number of malware
variants in fk. Therefore, the distribution frequency of vi in
fk, in relation to the number of malware variants containing
it is defined as MDFvi , and is referred to as the Malware





The count of malware variants in every malware family in
which a specific basic block occurs, influences the criticality
of that basic block to be a potential candidate of a critical
malicious pattern for that malware family. As it affects the
criticality of a basic block more when it is the constituent basic
block of a greater number of malware variants of a malware
family, it is computed by MDFvi . For example, if basic block
vi occurs in fk in 2 malware variants, it should be less effective
comparatively, than in fj in which 5 malware variants contain
it. Furthermore, to compare the effectiveness ofMDFvi on the
classification, a new malware variant is classified by scoring
its constituent basic blocks according to its TFD value, as
shown in [20], as well as FamClassifier as it is defined
below.
Definition 2: The classification algorithm is defined as
multiplication of TFDi,k by MDFvi , as expressed in Equa-
tion 2.
FamClassifieri,k = TFDi,k ⇥MDFvi (2)
B. Malware Classification Methodology
A new malware variant is classified into its related malware
family based on scoring of each of its vi, according to the value
of FamClassifier, or TFD, and the malware family which
gets the highest score becomes the classification family. The
highest score is allocated to the score of a malware family
which gets the highest number of top TFD value or top
Famclassifier value for most of the constituent basic blocks
of the new malware variant. FamClassifier and TFD values
are computed for every distinguished basic block, vi, of the
new malware variant. Processed malware variants are either
classified, or they remain unclassified based on the current state
of the dataset. Processed malware variants are the unpacked
new malware variants, and in the readable format by the
classifier. The readable format for the classifier is a multiset of
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basic blocks for each malware variant, which are hashed. If a
malware variants is classified successfully, then the state of the
current dataset is updated. After each update of the dataset, the
TFDi,k, and MDFvi value for the constituent basic blocks
of the malware variants in the unclassified malware samples
are updated and checked by the classifier for possible further
matches. This update and further similarity measurement is
performed due to the fact that every time a malware variant
replicates, it carries some new pieces of code. However, it is
not completely a new firmware, and still carries shared code
from its previous version. So it is possible to identify it based
on the shared code and classify it into its related malware
family, noticing that some new code is also introduced into
the corresponding malware family which may match a variant
in the unclassified malware samples. The initial dataset is
developed with a limited number of malware families, 23, but
obviously there are more malware families in the wild, and
from time to time a new malware family is introduced by the
malware authors. Therefore, there is a high possibility that the
unclassified malware variants do not belong to any malware
family existing in the dataset. Thus, another module checks if a
number of unclassified malware variants share a certain amount
of malicious code (critical malicious pattern) together, then
groups them together and introduces a new possible malware
family into the dataset. This is the cycle of classification of
the new malware variants.
C. Experimental Set-up
In order to make the experiment as accurate as possible,
the following parameters are applied. Every malware variant
is classified into a malware family based on the similarity
measurement of its constituent basic blocks in comparison to
the critical malicious patterns of different malware families
which exist in the dataset. As described earlier, the most critical
malicious patterns in every malware family, the authors have
relied on the shared basic blocks among different malware
variants, which potentially occur in one specific family at
most [20]. To do so, TFDi,k and FamClassifieri,k need
to be computed for all the constituent basic blocks of the
new malware variant to make it comparable with the critical
malicious patterns. If a basic block existed previously in the
dataset, it will be assigned the TFDi,k, and if it has not
occurred before, it will be assigned a null value and will
not be involved in the classification. In other words, a new
malware variant will be classified based on its constituent basic
blocks, which have already occurred in one or more malware
variants in the dataset, and if none of its basic blocks occurred
previously it is considered to be unclassified. To achieve this,
an unlabelled malware family is created, and the new malware
variants are added to this family one by one in order to
include the new variants’ constituent basic blocks in the dataset
and compute the required values. Therefore, initially for all
the constituent basic blocks of the new malware variant, just
as for any other malware variants existing in the dataset,
the required values such as TFRi,k, TFDi,k, MDFvi , and
FamClassifieri,k are computed, unless it has not occurred
previously. Two main queries which make the classification
possible are as listed below:
1) classify fc [path] scoring;
2) classify tfd [path] scoring;
In the first query, fc stands for FamClassifier, and it is
computed for every vi of the new malware variants; path is the
path of the new malware variants to be classified, and scoring
lists the corresponding malware families in which vi has
occurred and vi is its critical malicious pattern in comparison
with other malware families. Therefore, for every occurrence
of vi as a critical malicious pattern of fk, fk receives a positive
score and the malware family with the highest score will be
appointed as the best match for classification. The malware
family with the highest score signifies that it shares more
critical malicious patterns with the new malware. New malware
variants to be classified can be added to the dataset individually
or in a batch form; however, they are classified one by one, and
the status of the dataset is updated after every addition process,
regardless of being added to the classified or unclassified
category. Query 2, follows the same approach as query 1
in terms of scoring, but classification is performed based on
the TFDi,k value. This means that the malware distribution
frequency, MDFvi has not influenced the classification.
D. Unclassified Malware
Unclassified malware, refers to the malware variant with
which the classifier is not able to associate a malware family.
The reason for not being able to classify a malware variant
based on the current implementation of the classification
method is because no shared basic blocks exist between
the new malware variant and the dataset. Although not yet
implemented, the proposed approach, as described earlier, is
to store all the unclassified malware variants in one malware
family and label it as unclassified; after every successful
classification of new malware variants and by growing the size
of the dataset, they will be again checked for a possible match.
Also, by measuring the similarity of unclassified malware
variants with one another, if a number of malware variants
in the unclassified malware group share a certain number
of basic blocks, they will be associated together to create
a new malware family. Allowing the introduction of new
malware families and growing the dataset can be supervised
by administrator intervention for more accurate classification.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Performance analysis of the proposed method includes
evaluation of the accuracy of the experimental results, and
the running time of the malware classification methods. In
the following, the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed
method is inspected, as well as the degree of classification
correctness by performing cross validation on the dataset.
The classification correctness and effectiveness depends upon
correct malware family assignment of the malware variants
when developing the training dataset; in other words, initially
labelling the malware variants according to antivirus scanner
results, as well as the newly defined formal methods. To
assess the classification results, we count the number of false
matches (F) and true (T) matches, and compute the accuracy of
the results accordingly. The accuracy of known and unknown
malware variants is measured as defined in Equation 3:
Accuracy =
T
(T + F )
(3)
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We expect the accuracy for each malware family classifi-
cation to be close to 1, which indicates how closely the test
determines true matches.
A. Effectiveness and Efficiency
Effectiveness and efficiency refer to the responsiveness
and running time of the classification algorithm, given the
consumed resources. The running time to classify each mal-
ware variant is measured by means of the embedded method
timeCommand(), and it can be obtained when classification
scoring is presented for each malware family. For instance, the
elapsed time to classify a malware variant by FamClassifier
on average lies between 26 seconds and 42 seconds, and by
TFD lies betweem 0.09 seconds and 0.12 seconds. Clearly
there is a huge gap between the two, and one of the reasons
for this is the implementation design. The values of tfdi,k and
MDFvi for all the basic blocks in the dataset, are updated after
every malware classification. However, famClassifier takes
a longer time to classify as it is required to loop through all
the malware variants in the dataset and compute the occur-
rences of every MDFvi in each malware family, which is a
resource consuming and time consuming process. To check the
effectiveness of the classifiers in classifying known malware
variants, we use the same test set as the training dataset itself.
The classifiers are able to classify all malware variants, but
there are occurrences of false classifications by both of the
classifiers. FamClassifier shows better classification results
on known malware variants than TFD, with 2% improvement.
More details on each malware family classification and corre-
sponding accuracy are given in the next part, Section IV-B. To
determine whether FamClassifier or TFD shows a better
response in terms of unknown malware variants classification,
K-fold cross validation on the dataset is employed. In other
words, the effectiveness of critical malicious patterns and
malware distribution frequency of each basic block, on the
classification outcome is assessed. To test the classification
algorithms, each malware family is randomly partitioned into
5 subsets of approximately the same number of variants, and
similar file size. Testing is repeated 5 times, and every time
one subset of the dataset is used as the test set, and the other
4 subsets are combined together to form the training dataset.
Furthermore, training dataset is used to calibrate the test and
validate the effectiveness of the classification result. The result
shows that both of the classifiers are able to classify all the
malware variants in the test datasets. Contrary to the results
for known malware variants classification, TFD outperforms
FamClassifer in terms of accurate classification and also
the duration it takes to classify; details on the classification
results are given in Section IV-B.
B. Correctness of Classification Algorithms
By correctness of classification algorithms, we refer to the
accuracy of classifying known and unknown malware variants
into malware families. In more technical terms, the rate of
false matches and that of true matches of the classification.
For the TFD classifier the accuracy rate is 93.77%, which
implies the misclassified rate of known malware variants based
on the most critical malicious patterns of every malware
family is 6.23%. This misclassification rate can be caused
by wrong initial preprocessing and labelling of the malware
samples. However, the FamClassifier classification method
shows better results in terms of known malware classification,
although the duration of its execution time highly exceeds
that of the TFD classifier as discussed previously. More than
95% of known malware variants are classified correctly, which
means MDFvi has 1.23% positive effect on the accuracy
of known malware classification. Unexpected or unknown
malware variants classification results are in the reverse order,
and the TFD classifier outperforms the FamClassifier by
approximately 4%. The TFD classifier has an accuracy rate
of 83.44% and the FamClassifier accuracy rate is 79.73%.
This reversed accuracy rate of classification results between
known and unknown malware variants can be explained as the
count of malware variants containing a specific basic block in
a malware family does not particularly affect the criticality of
that basic block as being a potential representative of critical a
malicious pattern for unknown malware variants classification.
Possible reasons for this will be discussed in more detail in
Section V. Looking into the accuracy rate of different malware
families classification with regard to known malware variants,
Unruy family holds the lowest accuracy rate by either of
the classifiers, and with regard to unknown malware variants,
ATRAPS family has the lowest accuracy rate for both of the
classifiers; however, no specific malware families shows the
highest accuracy classification rate for either of the classifiers.
The result of known malware variants classified by the
TFD classifier shows 8 of 23 malware families are classified
100% accurately, 7 of 23 malware families are classified with
average accuracy rate of 95%, 7 of 23 malware families are
classified with average accuracy rate of above 85%, and 1
last malware family is classified with approximate accuracy
rate of 72%. The results of known malware variants classified
by the FamClassifier shows 6 of 23 malware families are
classified 100% accurately, 10 of 23 malware families are
classified with average 93% accuracy rate, and the remaining
6 malware families are classified with average accuracy rate
of 85%, and 1 last malware family is classified by lowest
classification accuracy of 75%. Furthermore, the results of
unknown malware variants classified by the TFD classifier
shows that only 1 malware family is classified 100% accurately
which is Cosmu family, 4 of 23 malware families are classified
with average accuracy rate of 94%, 8 of 23 are classified
with average accuracy rate of 85%, 4 of 23 malware families
are classified with average accuracy rate of 75%, 4 of 23
malware families are classified with average accuracy rate
of 66%, and the remaining 2 malware families are classified
with average accuracy rate of 50%; and result of unknown
malware variants classified by tFamClassifier shows no
malware family is classified 100% accurately, 3 of 23 malware
families are classified with average accuracy rate of 96%, 5 of
23 malware families are classified with average accuracy rate
of 85%, 6 of 23 malware families are classified with average
accuracy rate of 76%, 4 of 23 malware families are classified
with average accuracy rate of 66%, 2 of 23 malware families
are classified with average accuracy rate of 54%, and 3 of 23
malware families are classified with average accuracy rate of
44%.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
To understand the classification accuracy rate outcome,
we looked further into one of the well classified malware
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families, MyDoom, and one of the less accurate classified
malware families, Unruy were investigated further. The top
10 values of TFD on basic blocks of both of the families
were queried. There is an obvious difference between the
distribution frequency and count of basic blocks of the named
malware families. This indicates that the basic blocks in the
Unruy family are less in-common in comparison to MyDoom,
and provides us with a good understanding of the functional
structure of Unruy family. Comparing more number of the
malware families in the dataset in the same way reveals a
shortcoming in the preprocessing phase, which is that the
closeness of the replication versions of the malware variants
in each malware family were not observed. Malware variants
from the same malware family can be very different from
one another as the replication timeline between the versions
increases. However, this can be addressed by adding a thresh-
old on the accepted TFD value for vi to become a critical
malicious pattern and affect the classification, which is an
issue for the implementation, but not the concept. Also, it
was observed that malware families such as Spyware, and
Kryptik, which share a certain amount of functionality with
each other can cause misclassification. For example both of the
malware families tend to install on the host machine and obtain
information about the user. Therefore, these malware families
share very similar components and as the present classification
method is based on the basic blocks which represent the
functionality of the malware families, it can produce false
matches. This observation suggests that the malware families
defined in the training dataset should be more coarse grained in
the functionality of different malware families, when preparing
the training dataset. Another reason may be the labelling by
the antivirus scanners that we used to pre-classify the training
dataset, since several malware variants are tagged by different
antivirus scanners as belonging to multiple malware families,
and we chose the most frequent one. Therefore, this could also
be the result of incorrect initial labelling.
As explained previously, the TFD classifier shows a
better classification accuracy rate, and the time it takes to
classify new malware variants is insignificant in comparison
to FamClassifier. This is because the update module re-
freshes the TFDi, k and MDFvi after every single malware
classification. FamClassifier takes much longer because
the computation of MDFvi at run time, which involves the
execution of multiple loops. Multiple loops are implemented
as it is measured for every basic block in every malware
family, and needs to be checked for its occurrence in every
malware variant. However, considering the time and accuracy
of both of the classifiers, the TFD classifier is preferred
and it is proposed to involve more details of the malicious
software to be included in the critical malicious pattern to
increase the accuracy, such as the strings, the information
contained in the import-export tables of the malware, the file
type, etc. to potentially improve the accuracy rate. Nonetheless,
previous studies have shown that combining different features
extracted from malware variants for classification purposes
does not necessarily produce better results, as it can produce
noise in the outcome [22], but the present approach has not
been tried before and could lead to a different outcome.
Nevertheless, it is contended that the proposed approach in
the present research is simple, accurate, and effective. It can
be applied to other features of the malicious software, by
extracting the feature of interest, computing its hash value,
and applying the TFD algorithm to obtain the pattern for
each malware family. Thus, the present methodology can be
used to retrieve critical information about each malware family,
which is essential to understand malicious software, while
also generating an effective general pattern for the numerous
malware variants of each malware family. Based on these
results, there is no specific relationship between the number of
malware variants in each malware family and the classification
accuracy rate, which is explicable since the ratio of frequencies
of different features is computed with respect to the size of the
training dataset. The evaluation of the present formalisation is
relatively straightforward since the formalisation is based on
the statistics. The counts, and the implementation outcomes
have been checked manually and found to be accurate. The
selection of the present malware families and the basic blocks
in the listings and examples are in principle arbitrary.
The main drawback of our approach is the size of the
dataset. Clearly, a greater number of malware variants and
malware families will provide more details on each malware
family and lead to more precise critical malicious patterns.
Another important factor is the accuracy of labelling the
malware variants by anti-virus scanners, to develop the training
dataset, as every wrong pre-classification of malware variants
will lead to a misclassified outcome in the evaluation phase.
Nonetheless, in this research, the proposed concept is being
proofed and these factors are relatively trivial. In this paper,
the statistical approach recently published in [20] has been
followed, which discovers and generates critical malicious pat-
terns in malware families, by which new malware variants are
classified accordingly. Critical malicious patterns are defined
as the most frequent basic blocks in one malware family, while
relatively less frequent in other malware families. Moreover,
the critical malicious pattern of every malware family has been
used as a criterion for new malware variants classification.
Classification is performed by two methods, one is the TFD
classifier which computes the similarity measurement of the
new malware variant with the malware families that exist in
the training dataset, based on the critical malicious pattern;
FamClassifier is the other classifier which classifies mal-
ware variants based on the critical malicious pattern, as well as
malware frequency distribution of every distinct basic block in
a malware family. The effectiveness and accuracy rate of both
of the classifiers has been evaluated and the TFD classifier
is preferred, as it outperforms FamClassifier in time and
classification of unknown malware variants. In addition, it is
concluded that there is no specific association between the
number of malware variants in the malware families, and the
classification accuracy rate that has been observed, and this
is explicable by the definition of the formalisation, which is
based on the frequency ratio of the basic blocks occurrences.
The possible inclusion of addition malware variant features
as part of the classification criteria is proposed to increase
the classification accuracy rate, as part of the future work.
Also, the possible mislabelling of the malware variants in the
preprocessing phase of this research by anti-virus scanners, has
been observed as one of the impact factors of false matches by
the classifiers. Finally, an increase in the number of malware
variants in the training dataset is recommended, in order to aid
wider evaluation of the classifiers in terms of responsiveness
and correctness.
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